The originality of John Philoponus' temporal theory has been underestimated.The paper emphasizes Philoponus' creativity, especially in his reconciliation of Plato's and Aristotle's temporal theories (or at least one possible interpretation of Aristotle's account of time). To this end, the paper sketches both Plato's (and later Neoplatonic interpretations of Plato) and suggests an interpretation of Aristotle's accounts of time, which is at odds with the Platonic and Neoplatonic view of time. It next presents Philoponus' reconstruction of Aristotle's account along Platonic lines and concludes with the relevance of these ancient theories to contemporary temporal discussions.
reading of the Physics. And indeed the views of the medieval schoolmen have, too varying degrees, impacted our own views of Aristotle's Physics.
Thus it is reasonable to suggest that even today Philoponus' commentary is either directly or indirectly still shaping our understanding of Aristotle's
Physics.
This influence is perhaps nowhere more evident than in Philoponus' interpretation of Aristotle's theory of time. 2 Yet I am unaware of any systematic study of Philoponus' account of time. 3 The reason no doubt is that Philoponus' temporal theory appears to be nothing more than a close reading of Aristotle's own theory of time. But as David Bostock has observed "Of all the discussions in the Physics, the treatment of time in Chapters 10-14 is the least well In the following study, however, I want to suggest reasons for thinking that Philoponus' commentary is more than just a "cleaned up" reading of Aristotle's text. Rather, it might be viewed as an attempt to grapple with two disparate positions concerning the nature of time. One view is that any adequate account of time must include some reference to temporal becoming. The other view is that one can fully explain the nature of time without appealing to temporal becoming. Very roughly speaking the former position imagines that time is a type of motion or flow. Thus, one might say it is a "kinetic" account of 
I
I limit my discussion of Plato's temporal theory to comments he makes in a small but well known passage from the Timaeus, namely, 37C8-D7. 6 I begin with a free paraphrase of the passage and then offer commentary.
For Every Time there is a Season
Plato tells us that the Father, who had begotten, took thought to form the world more like its paradigm. Since the living creature, which is the paradigm of the world, is eternal the Father attempted to form the all in the same way insofar as it was in his power. Now the nature of the living creature is to be eternal; however, it is impossible to confer eternity upon that which is generated. Thus the Father made the all a certain moving (kinhtñn) image or semblance (eÞkÅn) of eternity; and with the ordering of the heavens he made an everlasting image proceeding according to number (katƒ riymòn Þoèsan aÞÅnion eÞkñna), abiding an eternity in unity. Truly, concludes Timaeus, this is that which we call time.
Setting aside the mythological nature of the account, Plato attempts to explain the temporal in terms of the eternal, becoming in terms of being. Such a move is not surprising, since for Plato all real explanations must appeal to the unchanging, eternal Forms. Thus, I gloss Plato's theory of time as follows.
Since the paradigm of our universe is eternal, Plato argues that it has all of its being complete and perfect. This quality of the ever complete and perfect possession of being the demiurge cannot confer upon the universe. For that which comes to be cannot have always been complete and perfect. Although the demiurge cannot communicate complete and perfect being on the universe, it can bestow successive being, that is, becoming, on the universe. I call this "successive being" since for the universe "that which is" is imperfect or constantly changing (as opposed to the complete and perfect being of the paradigm). In other words, for the realm of becoming, that is, the sensible cosmos, that which is at any moment passes away into non-being, while that which will be comes out of non-being into being. For example, the moment that initiated reading this paper no longer is, whereas the currently present moment now is, although at the time when one began reading, it was future and so was not. The universe, then, does not have being as the paradigm does, namely as something complete and perfect; rather, it has its being piecemeal. "That which is" in the sensible world is only the immediately present and it is the coming into being and passing away, that is, the motion or flow of that which the universe presently is, that is time. For Plato, then, the flow of the now provides an unconditional and independent framework by which all natural processes can be assigned a time. Although certain ancient and modern commentators identify Plato's account with Aristotle's second opinion, that is, time is the motion of the whole or heavens, the suggestion is problematic. 8 First, this identification is most likely due to Plato's rather incautious comment at Timaeus 39D, where he claims that time is the wandering of the planets, which would include the motion of the sun and moon. The context for this passage, however, concerns how we measure time. The motion of the sun and moon, Plato tells us, is the standard measure by which we measure all other processes. Time considered independent of the human act of measuring, however, need not, and probably was not for Plato, the movement of the planets, but the flow of the now, as I have suggested. Thus, the identification of Plato's view of time with the motion of the heavens might be due to mistaking "measured time" for "metaphysical time," that is, time considered as what is measured, which is at least ontologically prior to the measuring. alone, which its procession is said to unfold ( nelÛttein), and earlier from both the demiurge and from its eternity, of which it is indeed also said to be an image, in relation to which it was brought to completion as moving" (Proclus, In Tim., III, 31, 7-10).
Neoplatonists most vividly captured this conception of time as the unfolding of what is with the imagery of "flowing time" or the "river of time."
Damascius offers, perhaps, the clearest statement of this metaphor.
For each river is a static form (eädow ¥sthkñw), from which the flow of the river is sustained, receiving the form in flow. And if you made the river stand [and not flow], the river will no longer be. Also in this way the present, past and future according to form are put together in the one form of time, while they are unfolded in becoming: that which is always proceeding to being is called the present, 13 while that which has perished is the past and that which is not yet is the future. And thus the whole of time is constantly flowing just like motion. which is (present) is changing, but this claim just is that the now flows.
Similarly, if time were a type of motion, then there must be the thing that is moving of which time is that thing's motion. And again, the most likely candidate for the moving thing seems to be the now. I shall not insist that these propositions are identical, but it is the most simple reading and so I shall
assume it in what follows.
In this all too short summary of later Neoplatonic conceptions of time, Plato, in at least one respect, was seen as adopting a kinetic account of time. 
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The arguments are quick but telling. In the first argument Aristotle observes that there is no motion over and above moving things. 15 That is to say that there is no such thing as abstract or "free floating" motion; rather, motion is only found in determinate moving objects. Thus if time were a type of motion, then it would only be present in the moving thing of which time is that thing's motion. Time, however, is present everywhere and can be found accompanying all things that move. Therefore, if time were a type of motion, it would be difficult to explain its "universally present" (pantaxoè) nature.
Such an objection is immediately applicable to the view that identifies time with the motion of the planets, a view, as we saw above, that has been ascribed, probably erroneously, to Plato. For if time simply were the motion of the sun and moon (or any other heavenly body), then time would be localized at just these celestial bodies. Such a suggestion gives rise to the paradoxical conclusion that time does not belong inherently to the various natural processes found on the Earth, although these processes could be accidentally assigned a time. The argument, however, need not apply to time considered as the flow of the now, where the now is a derivative notion taken from all that presently is, and so the cosmos taken in toto. For what is the moving thing just is the world, which clearly is "universally present." Still, such a suggestion would need to be fleshed out for Aristotle.
Even if there are means for a kinetic account of time to avoid this first objection, another is waiting. For Aristotle observes that it does seem to be a fact that each and every motion involves some rate of change, that is, so much change occurs over so much time; or to say roughly the same thing, motion occurs at some speed. Consequently, if time flowed, that is, were a type of motion, then it too should have a rate of change; however, it is meaningless to ask "how fast is time flowing?" Moreover, since all motions occur at some speed and speed is a function of distance over time, to say that time is a type of motion would in effect be to define time in terms of time. The lesson that one should take from these arguments is that time cannot simply be identi- puzzles Aristotle raises concerning the reality of time Aristotle himself is committed to temporal becoming and so by extension that the various difficulties are all part of his general dialectic. 16 Thus, for these interpreters these issues might be seen as presenting a challenge that Aristotle must address and resolve in his own positive account of time. Others, however, argue that in light of the previous arguments and problems mentioned by Aristotle concerning a kinetic temporal theory that time for him simply cannot involve temporal becoming. 17 "after" (ìsteron) state. Third, the moving object occupies the interval bounded by the before and after states (201b5-7). An example may clarify these points.
Consider the motion of a ball. The ball is in one spatial location, x, and then in a different location, y. The ball's actually being at x is for it to be in a state of potentially being at y. The ball's being in the interval bounded or marked off by the spatial locations x and y -in other words, the ball's going from potentially being at y to its actually being at y -is the ball's motion.
Based upon this analysis of motion, the static interpreters of Aristotle can explain how time, though not identical with motion, is related to motion.
Again consider the ball example. When one perceives a ball spatially located at x and then at y, one is aware of two conceptually distinct nows. One now corresponds with one's perception that the ball is at x and the other now corresponds with one's perception that the ball is at y. Consequently, one can mark off two distinct nows that correspond with one's different perceptions and these perceptions follow upon ( kolouyeÝ) the different before and after states of a moving object. When one perceives the motion of the ball between these two extremes, that is, the motion's before and after states, one also recognizes an interval that extends between or is bounded by two conceptually distinct nows. But Aristotle posited that whatever is marked off or bounded by the now is time. Time, then, follows upon motion, but is not identical with motion. For time is according to Aristotle whatever is marked off by a before and after now, and the varying states of a moving object are the cause of the soul's marking off conceptually distinct nows. 18 Aristotle makes the point in his usual terse manner:
Therefore, it seems that no time has elapsed whenever we perceive the Before quitting Aristotle, one should take note that on the suggested interpretation although time measures motion, it is not itself a type of motion.
Just as distance is not a type of motion, neither is time a type of motion;
rather, these are only measures of motion. What is in motion, that is, moving, is only the moving thing, not the measure of the moving thing's motion.
If one adopts this interpretation of Aristotle, it should be clear that Plato's (as well as later Neoplatonists') account and Aristotle's would be fundamentally different, if not mutually exclusive.
III
We are now in a position to consider Philoponus' account of time and how it goes beyond a simple and straightforward restatement of Aristotle's text. . That is to say that according to Philoponus something in the motion must be before and after and that thing flows.
Philoponus, then, continues that the before and after in magnitude are proportionate to the before and after in motion because the motion comes across a before part of the spatial magnitude, so that we call it "before," and then over a second part, so that we call it "second," that is, "after."
In general, Philoponus' comments are Aristotelian; however, his aside about the flowing before and after certainly goes beyond Aristotle's text and is, I
maintain, Platonic. He has introduced the notion that a moving or flowing before and after belongs to motion distinct from merely the moving thing itself. Of course, if Philoponus were simply to mean that insofar as an object, such as a ball, changes, its before and after states change, then his position would be similar to the Aristotelian position sketched above; for the flow of a now is not being invoked, but merely the change of an object. Philoponus, we shall see, intends more, namely, that something analogous to a point, that is, the now, is associated with motion and by this point's flow it generates befores and afters and consequently time.
At 721, 16-17 and 22, Philoponus, following Aristotle, tells us that the before and after are boundaries (õrÛzontew) in motion by which one recognizes time and also that time is bounded by the now. In this respect Philoponus' interpretation is in line with the position limned earlier; the before and after are equated with the now that marks off the boundaries of time. Philoponus, then adds at 725, 13-14 that the now also is the generator of time and it generates time by its flow.
The now is the efficient cause (poihtikòn aàtion) of time; for the flow of this generates time. Therefore, just as the point (shmeÝon) is related to magni- In this passage Philoponus is arguing that Aristotle's temporal theory is in to be rejecting is that the now can change at an instant or more generally that there can be motion at an instant. At least for Aristotle motion at an instant is impossible. 25 As for possibility (2) , since the now is analogous to a point and for Aristotle no two points can be immediately adjacent to one another, the now could not cease to be in any purportedly immediately adjacent now. 26 The suggestion is that motion has an atomic structure and so by extension time has an atomic structure, that is, time is a composite of discrete extended instants or nows, a position that Aristotle explicitly rejects at Physics VI 1 and 3. Concerning the last suggestion that the now changes in some subsequent (non-adjacent) now, since between any two points there is a line in which there is a potentially infinite number of other points, so too between any two nows there would be a potentially infinite number of nows. Consequently, if the currently present now were to cease to be in any subsequent now, it would have to be simultaneous with the infinite number of other nows in between the now when it was present and the now when it ceased to be, which is absurd. Here the suggested change of the now involves gradual change. In principle there is nothing objectionable to continuous or gradual change for
Aristotle. The difficulty comes in ascribing such a change to the now. Since the aporia exhausts all the possible ways that the now might change, it provides one with philosophical reasons for denying that the now changes or flows at all.
Admittedly, the objection is an aporia and need not represent Aristotle's own considered opinion. It might be thought merely to present the temporal theorist with a challenge that an adequate account of time must address. Indeed, some commentators who believe that Aristotle is committed to temporal becoming have taken it just this way. They argue that Aristotle's claim that the now is in one sense the same and in another different (219b12-15), which was considered above, is the key to the puzzle. Thus, they maintain that insofar as the now is something persisting it never changes with respect to its essential nature, that is, its "nowness" or "presentness." Nonetheless, the various (accidental) states that befall it do change, that is, its being 12:00 A.M. 
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For time might, then, be a particular type of motion, while not being motion in general.
Concerning Aristotle's first concern that motion is only in the thing that moves, whereas time is present everywhere (pantaxoè), Philoponus acknowledges its full force. When Philoponus turns to the topic of time's being simultaneously the same (ad 219b10), however, he again introduces the issue of time's being everywhere and his comments there are telling.
All time is assumed to be simultaneous ('ma) everywhere (pantaxoè). In this respect it is one and the same; for it measures the before and after of every motion (not however that of alteration and augmentation), so the before and after of the moving things that come to be simultaneously are the same, so also the time is the same; however, this is no longer fitting to say concerning motion. For motions are not simultaneously the same; rather, on the one hand, In many respects Philoponus' comments are faithful to Aristotle. Philoponus observes that insofar as events or things are simultaneous, they must be in a now that is one and the same everywhere. Since the now is one and the same everywhere, and time is related to the now, time will not be solely becoming as "past," "present" and "future" and the tenses "was," "is" and "will be." The application of such terms changes depending on when they are used.
For example, at breakfast this morning it was true that I will work on this
paper, but at the present I am working on it and at dinner I was working on it. This event with respect to the A series, then, changes. On the other hand, the B series involves such static temporal terms as "earlier" and "later" or "before" and "after"; and as such any event with respect to the B series always remains the same. Thus, for example, it was always and unchangingly true that I had breakfast before I worked on this paper. suggestion is not to be vacuous, it might mean that the moving thing that we identify with the now is the universe itself, or to be more exact, the universe's state of actuality as opposed to its potentiality. In this case, however, the now per se is not flowing or moving; rather, the universe as a whole is
For Every Time there is a Seasonchanging. Hence time has been confused with motion or change and the flowing now with the universe itself. For the detractors of temporal becoming, then, there is no fact of temporal becoming that needs to be explained, but a confusion between motion and time that needs to be clarified.
Certain contemporary temporal theorists prefer to say that the now is a predicate or property that attaches to events, or event-particles, and explains their presentness. They often employ the much rehearsed metaphor of the now's sweeping over a series of events and making those that it hits upon present just like a spotlight's sweeping over a chorus line successively illuminates each dancer. I think here again the static interpreters' analysis is insightful in pointing out a confusion. First, in what meaningful sense can one say that a property or predicate "sweeps over," "flows," "changes" or in general
"becomes" at all? Properties themselves do not change. Red, hot and the like do not change qua red or hot; rather, objects change with respect to their properties. Similarly, predicates themselves do not change; rather, the subjects change such that one ascribes different predicates to them. Consequently, when things change, one ascribes to them, on account of their state of actuality, the predicate being present. This ascription involves no fact of temporal becoming, but only the change of an object. Thus unlike McTaggart and others, who believe time is required for change, the static interpreters insists that the order of explanation is just the reverse, change is required for time.
Furthermore, even if one could make out a theory of properties themselves changing, one can still ask in what meaningful way does the property of being present or now change or flow? It certainly does not change with respect to its being present; for this is the very feature that the property is intended to convey upon events. Nor could this property of being present flow into either the past or future. It is absurd to say that the very property that makes something right now be present is either in the past or future. If it is past, then it no longer is present and so does not presently belong to an event so as to make the event present, and mutatis mutandis if it is future. The thing which changes again seem to be the totality of concrete things in the world, not the property of being present. Thus the metaphor should not be that the now is like a spot light that moves over a stationary line of dancers, but that dancers move into and out of a stationary spot of light. The original metaphor, our static interpreters would observe, confuses a flowing now with changing concrete things.
In conclusion, we have looked at Plato's kinetic account of time and one pos- 
